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OWNERSHIP IN CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS BY EMERGING MULTINATIONALS 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: Despite prior studies on cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) having analyzed the determinants of 
ownership strategies, there is still a quest for evidence showing how the differences between home and host 
market characteristics affect the ownership percentage. Prior studies have acknowledged that entering host 
countries with greater uncertainty makes multinationals reluctant to acquire high levels of ownership. 
Nevertheless, emerging multinationals (EMNEs) are usually used to operating under greater levels of 
uncertainty than multinationals from advanced countries (AMNEs), which can imply different ownership 
strategies. The purpose of this study is to analyze the ownership percentage acquired by MNEs when 
designing CBAs in emerging or advanced countries and to determine the extent to which the ownership 
strategy in emerging countries differs between EMNEs and AMNEs. 
Design/methodology/approach: The mobile telecommunications industry is used as a research setting to 
provide empirical evidence of the interaction effect of the advanced versus emerging nature of host and 
home countries on the ownership acquired in CBAs. 
Findings: The results confirm that both home and host countries’ characteristics are relevant in explaining 
the ownership strategies of MNEs.  
Originality/value: The authors contribute to the strategy and IB literature by providing empirical evidence 
for the recent debate on whether the internationalization strategies followed by EMNEs are similar to the 
traditional patterns of AMNEs and determining how EMNEs differ from AMNEs in their ownership 
strategies in emerging countries. Focusing on the mobile telecommunications industry, the authors also 
contribute by extending the analysis to an international and cross-cultural setting that includes 48 mobile 
groups from 35 home and 81 host countries. 






Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have substantially increased their contribution to economic 
activity in the last couple of decades, and currently they generate almost one-third of the world’s total 
production (OECD, 2018). In their internationalization process, MNEs should make two key strategic 
decisions, namely entry mode and ownership (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Regarding the former, they can 
internationalize through a greenfield investment—establishing the new company from scratch—or by 
performing a cross-border acquisition (CBA)—acquiring an existing company in the new country. The two 
modes of entry have some advantages and disadvantages (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Slangen and 
Hennart, 2007). Nevertheless, in the last few years, CBAs have shown stronger growth than greenfield 
investments (UNCTAD, 2018), encouraging researchers to analyze the determinants of CBAs in greater 
depth. 
When MNEs enter a country through a CBA, the second key decision to make is the percentage of 
ownership to acquire in the target company (Chari and Chang, 2009; Cuypers et al., 2015; Malhotra and 
Gaur, 2014). The evidence shows that the CBAs of MNEs vary significantly in respect of the ownership 
acquired (Chari and Chang, 2009; Chikhouni et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2020; Wang and Larimo, 2020). 
According to the prior literature, the choice of ownership acquired is determined by factors such as the 
resource commitment, the expected control by the MNE over the target company or the risks and 
performance of the acquisition (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Delios and Beamish, 1999). The literature 
rooted in the transaction cost theory (also known as institutional economics) has traditionally suggested 
that environmental uncertainty increases the difficulty for foreign buyers in seeking, negotiating with and 
monitoring market transaction partners (Williamson, 1981). In contexts with higher environmental 
uncertainty, MNEs prefer to acquire lower levels of ownership to gain the flexibility to respond to 
environmental changes (Li and Li, 2010; Yiu and Makino, 2002). Empirical studies have opened a debate 
about how the ownership strategy of MNEs varies depending on whether they expand to advanced or to 
emerging countries, which are characterized by different levels of uncertainty (Liou et al., 2016).[1] 
Emerging countries feature underdeveloped financial intermediaries and weak securities regulation, which 
 
 
1 We adopt the classification of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which distinguishes between 
advanced markets and emerging and developing economies, following similar previous studies (Liou et al., 
2017). In this paper, we use the terms “advanced” and “developed” synonymously. The same applies to the 
terms “emerging” and “developing.” The variables that the IMF takes into account to elaborate this 
classification are income per capita, export diversification and the degree of integration into the global 
financial system. For more details, see https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/faq.htm#q4b.  
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increase the perceived uncertainty of carrying out business in these countries (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; 
Zaheer, 1995). As a result, MNEs usually choose a greater ownership percentage when entering advanced 
countries, where the level of uncertainty tends to be lower than in emerging countries (Delios and Beamish, 
1999; Lebedev et al., 2015; Yiu and Makino, 2002).  
Prior studies have focused primarily on the institutional conditions of the host country as 
determinants of uncertainty. Nevertheless, the institutional conditions in the home country are also relevant 
in explaining the ownership strategy in CBAs (De Beule et al., 2014; Lebedev et al., 2015; Liou et al., 
2017). Recent research has suggested that, when expanding abroad, the strategies and performance of 
MNEs that come from emerging countries—emerging MNEs (EMNEs)—are different from those that 
come from advanced ones—advanced MNEs (AMNEs) (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; De Beule et al., 2014; 
Guillén and García-Canal, 2009; Luo et al., 2019). EMNEs are used to operating under political uncertainty 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016), high levels of corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006) and a lack of transparency in 
their home countries (Sun et al., 2012). These institutional difficulties provide EMNEs with better 
knowledge of the circumstances and procedures involved in operating in countries where the quality of 
institutions is weak, which is known as institutional learning (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018). As a result of 
this institutional learning, EMNEs develop some resources and capabilities to interact with weak 
institutions in host countries. Thus, compared with AMNEs, it is expected that EMNEs operate with greater 
guarantees in uncertain environments, such as emerging countries. We elaborate on this idea and consider 
that the uncertainty that MNEs perceive in the host country will also depend on the level of development 
of their home countries. Thus, host country characteristics are relevant in explaining the ownership 
strategies of MNEs, but the inclusion of home country characteristics is also necessary to comprehend these 
strategies fully. In spite of this, to our knowledge, prior studies have underexplored the interaction of host 
and home countries’ characteristics in the ownership level decision.  
Besides the home and host countries’ characteristics, the ownership strategy followed by MNEs can 
be conditioned by the characteristics of the industry in which CBAs take place. Previous studies have 
analyzed internationalization strategies in different contexts, such as R&D-intensive industries (Chari and 
Chang, 2009; Prashantham and Birkinshaw, 2015; Qian et al., 2018), the hotel industry (Romero-Martínez 
et al., 2019) or the tire industry (Rose and Ito, 2009). Our research focuses on one regulated industry, the 
mobile telecommunications industry, which has special features that make it an interesting context in which 
to analyze the ownership strategies followed by MNEs. In particular, regulated industries are subject to 
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greater political risk, which may require firms to make a strong commitment of resources (García-Canal 
and Guillén, 2008). This might imply that the interaction effect of the home and host countries’ 
characteristics is highly relevant when determining the ownership strategies of MNEs in regulated 
industries. We pay attention to this and investigate how host and home countries’ characteristics determine 
the ownership percentage acquired by telecom MNEs.  
The aim of this article is twofold. First, we pay attention to host countries’ characteristics and 
analyze the ownership percentage acquired by MNEs when designing CBAs in emerging or in advanced 
countries. Second, we incorporate the characteristics of the home country and analyze the extent to which 
the ownership strategy in emerging countries differs between EMNEs and AMNEs. Our findings confirm 
that both home and host countries’ characteristics are relevant in understanding the ownership strategies of 
MNEs. We show that telecom MNEs tend to acquire lower levels of ownership in emerging countries. 
Nevertheless, the origin of the MNE significantly moderates this relationship. EMNEs acquire higher levels 
of ownership in emerging countries than AMNEs. 
The contribution of this study is twofold. Firstly, we provide empirical evidence for the recent debate 
on whether the internationalization strategies followed by EMNEs are similar to the traditional patterns of 
AMNEs (Guillen and Garcia-Canal, 2009; Luo et al., 2019; Ramamurti, 2012). We shed light on this topic 
and analyze the extent to which EMNEs differ from AMNEs in their ownership strategies in emerging 
countries. In doing so, we argue that the integration of home and host countries’ characteristics is necessary 
to comprehend fully the ownership strategies in CBAs. Secondly, our research centers on the global mobile 
telecommunications industry and includes a wide number of telecom MNEs and many home and host 
countries. This allows us to expand prior studies by extending the analysis to an international and cross-
cultural setting. Previous studies that have analyzed the effect of institutional distance on ownership 
strategies have usually been limited to a few home or host countries (Pinto et al., 2017). This is surprising 
since many authors have warned against the use of a unique reference point when conducting institutional 
distance research (Brouthers et al., 2016; van Hoorn and Maseland, 2016). Using a sample that is 
compounded by a few home or host countries is problematic because it leads to the confluence of 
institutional distance and institutional profile effects (van Hoorn and Maseland, 2016). We contribute to 
prior studies by analyzing a sample that is compounded of 35 home countries and 81 host countries. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First, we present the theoretical framework and the 
hypotheses of this article. Second, we develop an empirical analysis to test these hypotheses. In particular, 
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this section begins with a detailed description of the ownership strategies that are followed by telecom 
MNEs in CBAs. We pay attention to the developed or emerging nature of the host countries where CBAs 
take place and, afterwards, we center on the developed or emerging nature of telecom MNEs. This allows 
us to obtain some interesting findings about the ownership strategies of telecom MNEs. Nevertheless, we 
take one step further and perform a regression analysis to test our hypotheses. Thus, we present the sample, 
the variables and the methodology that are used in the second analysis. Finally, we comment on the results 
of this research and offer a discussion on the main conclusions and future research directions that are 
derived from our study. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
The choice of the initial level of ownership in a CBA when an MNE enters a foreign market is 
important since it has a clear economic, financial and strategic impact on the acquirer and the target 
company (Chari and Chang, 2009; Ellis et al., 2018; Pinto et al., 2017). The acquisition of a high level of 
ownership in the target allows MNEs complete control over operations, facilitating the management 
functions within the subsidiary and providing access to a higher percentage of the profits. Contrarily, it 
entails greater risks and costs because of the commitment of resources and the lack of flexibility (Anderson 
and Gatignon, 1986; Li and Li, 2010; Authors, 2020[2]). By contrast, a lower level of ownership provides 
access to complementary resources that were not previously available and facilitates risk diversification 
(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Li and Li, 2010; Authors, 2020), but it leads to potential opportunistic costs 
associated with the post-acquisition integration and to a lack of control. 
When MNEs expand into a new host market through CBAs, they often do not have sufficient 
knowledge of the new context (Chari and Chang, 2009). The environment in the home country may be 
substantially different, which increases the challenge of understanding the complexities of conducting 
business in the host country (Mezias, 2002; Zaheer, 1995). As a result of cultural, normative, political and 
social structures and economic conditions, companies face difficulties that arise from being foreign in the 
new environment (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 2009). Therefore, the selection of the appropriate level of 
ownership may determine the success and survival of acquiring firms (Contractor et al., 2014; Delios and 
Beamish, 2001). The previous literature has demonstrated that the level of ownership initially acquired 
 
 
2 We do not provide the full reference to this forthcoming paper to maintain anonymity in the evaluation process.  
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depends on factors such as the board composition (Ilhan-Nas et al., 2018), CEO overconfidence (Lai et al., 
2017), cultural distance (Kim et al., 2020), home market size (Liou et al., 2015), psychic distance 
(Chikhouni et al., 2017) and other external factors (see Xie et al., 2017, for a review about the country 
determinants of M&As). A mistake in the ownership level may result in high integration costs that may 
destroy the CBA’s performance (Lahiri et al., 2014; Zhao et al., 2004). As a consequence, MNEs should 
carefully evaluate the ownership level to acquire when developing a CBA.  
We base this research on institutional economics and the institutional view to present two hypotheses 
on the level of ownership acquired by MNEs in CBAs. First, we use the pro-market view of institutions, 
which is derived from institutional economics, to explain how the quality of the host country’s institutions 
determines the ownership acquired by MNEs. Second, we rely on the institutional view to explain how the 
institutional learning acquired in the home country makes EMNEs more likely to acquire a higher level of 
ownership when conducting CBAs in emerging countries in comparison with AMNEs.  
2.1. The ownership level in CBAs: emerging vs. advanced host countries 
The decision about the percentage of ownership acquired by an MNE when performing a CBA is 
even more difficult when the CBA takes place in an emerging country characterized by institutional voids 
that increase the perceived level of uncertainty (Lebedev et al., 2015). Prior research has coined the term 
“institutional voids” to refer to the absence of market-supporting institutions that are usually requested by 
foreign investors to develop investments in a new country (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Emerging economies 
are characterized by underdeveloped capital and labor markets, in which a lack of financial and other 
specialized intermediaries makes it more difficult to accomplish key activities for developing activities 
abroad, such as information searching or negotiating with partners, customers and suppliers (Meyer et al., 
2009). Moreover, these markets suffer from a weak legal infrastructure, insufficient protection of property 
rights and weak judiciary systems to enforce contracts (Contractor et al., 2014). It has also been observed 
that corruption tends to be higher in emerging markets, so opportunistic behavior of market agents is more 
likely to occur (Judge et al., 2011).  
The institutional environment affects internationalization decisions (Hitt, 2016). In particular, 
previous studies have shown that confronting higher levels of uncertainty causes MNEs to acquire lower 
levels of ownership to obtain greater levels of flexibility (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Li and Li, 2010). Less 
resource commitment will allow them to leave the investment more easily if their expectations are 
unsatisfied. Additionally, previous studies have suggested that a smaller share of control is preferred when 
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there is potential for opportunism of local managers. The reason is that this provides incentives for target 
firm managers to cooperate in the post-entry period (Chari and Chang, 2009). This cooperation facilitates 
the transfer of tacit assets, such as market knowledge and relationships with suppliers, the local labor force 
and governments, from local managers to the acquirer’s managers (Chari and Chang, 2009; Chen and 
Hennart, 2004; Kogut and Singh, 1988). As Dow et al. (2016, p. 323) posited, “the buyer may prefer to 
leave a portion of the equity of the firm in hands of the prior management and owners, in order to give them 
a strong incentive to continue contributing to the success of the firm.” In accordance with these arguments, 
we suggest that higher levels of uncertainty lead to lower levels of acquired ownership with the aim of 
preserving flexibility (Delios and Beamish, 1999) and reducing the opportunistic behavior of local 
managers in the post-entry period (Chari and Chang, 2009). The greater the uncertainty in the host market, 
the greater the likelihood of taking minority shares instead of acquiring majority percentages (Gerpott and 
Jakopin, 2008; Liou et al., 2016; Xie et al., 2017).[3]  
In contrast, when MNEs perform CBAs in advanced countries, the institutional void tends to 
weaken. Advanced countries usually have strong financial systems that facilitate economic exchanges and 
strong legal and judiciary regimes that enforce contracts and protect property rights. Additionally, advanced 
countries usually have formal systems that enable foreign investors to develop their economic activities 
with lower levels of uncertainty and information asymmetry (Meyer et al., 2009). As formal procedures are 
explicit and market intermediaries work properly, it is easier for MNEs to obtain information and to 
negotiate contracts and enforce them. In other words, it is easier to undertake activities in advanced than in 
emerging countries. Thus, the level of uncertainty is lower in advanced countries, which allows MNEs to 
make a better assessment of the potential value and costs derived from the CBA, encouraging them to 
acquire a higher level of ownership. This reasoning leads us to propose our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The level of ownership acquired is lower when a CBA takes place in an emerging host 
country than in an advanced host country. 
 
 
3 This reasoning follows the “default” hypothesis of Anderson and Gatignon (1986, p. 8), which establishes that “a low 
level of ownership is preferable until proven otherwise.” As entering into a new international market entails risk and 
uncertainty, especially in emerging markets in which institutional voids exist, it reduces the incentive for acquiring 
firms to enter through wholly owned subsidiaries. However, it should be noted that Anderson and Gatignon (1986) 
highlighted some factors that reduce the perceived uncertainty in the new country because they allow a better 
assessment and judgment of local managers’ behavior. Among these factors, we emphasize the international experience 
of the acquirer and the institutional distance between home and host countries. When these factors hold, the incentives 
to acquire higher levels of ownership increase. As will be explained in Section 3.4, we include several control variables 
that consider these factors, such as the group international experience, the geographic distance and the cultural 
distance between the home country of the MNE and the host market in which the CBA takes place. 
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2.2. The ownership level in emerging countries: EMNEs vs. AMNEs 
Previous theories on firms’ internationalization, including those that are used to explain ownership 
level decisions, have usually been tested by analyzing the behavior of AMNEs in host developed and 
emerging countries (Luo et al., 2019). In many industries, the internationalization process of AMNEs 
started earlier than that of EMNEs. However, some years later, EMNEs appeared and showed an accelerated 
pace of internationalization. In this context, a recent debate in the international business literature has 
focused on whether prior theories, primarily applied to AMNEs, can also be used to explain the behavior 
of EMNEs (Luo and Tung, 2007). While some authors have argued that prior theories also explain EMNEs’ 
behavior, other research has claimed that the initial conditions of EMNEs, their motivation and the pace of 
their internationalization processes are quite different from those of AMNEs (Guillén and García-Canal, 
2009; Liou et al., 2016; Madhok and Keyhani, 2012). As a result, it has been argued that EMNEs have 
developed different resources and capabilities from AMNEs and differ substantially in their sources of 
competitive advantage (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Ramamurti, 2012). 
Compared with AMNEs, EMNEs tend to be smaller, have less advanced technology and fewer 
sophisticated resources and find it more difficult to access capital markets (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 
2008). However, EMNEs tend to develop certain skills and abilities in their home countries that are useful 
for managing institutionally difficult conditions. Since they have to deal with poorly developed institutions 
in their home countries, EMNEs acquire specific knowledge that is valuable for operating under adverse 
institutional conditions. This institutional learning can be highly useful when they decide to enter other 
emerging countries (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018). In accordance with this idea, previous studies have 
suggested that EMNEs face political uncertainty in their home countries that allows them to develop 
capabilities to deal with this type of uncertainty in the future (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). The capability 
acquired by EMNEs’ managers to interact with political instability will be useful for these firms to adjust 
better to political uncertainty and governmental changes when expanding abroad, primarily when entering 
emerging countries. For instance, Holburn and Zelner (2010) found that MNEs that have developed some 
capabilities to assess political risk or to manage policy-making processes in their home countries are able 
to confront political risk better in a new host country. In the same way, managers from EMNEs may face 
difficult situations in their home countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016) that help them to develop some 
capabilities to deal with similar conditions in the future. In particular, this institutional learning will result 
in EMNEs’ managers implementing specific organizational policies that will be useful in facing similar 
situations in a new country.  
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Additionally, due to their exposure to changing environments at home, EMNEs develop some 
improvisational management skills that enable them to react with greater flexibility (Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Ramamurti, 2016). For instance, Del Sol and Kogan (2007) demonstrated that Chilean companies had 
acquired knowledge from facing turbulent environments in their home country that helped them to obtain 
competitive advantages in other Latin American countries during the 1990s. Other studies have shown that, 
because of their prior experience with bribery, firms that come from countries with high levels of corruption 
are more likely to expand into other countries where corruption exists (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). 
All this institutional learning acquired in their home countries could be a source of competitive 
advantage for EMNEs in their internationalization processes (Martin, 2014). In particular, the resources 
and capabilities that have been developed as a result of this learning can be used to counteract the adverse 
conditions of emerging markets (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Meyer et al., 
2011), making EMNEs more able to operate effectively in countries with high levels of uncertainty 
(Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018). Because EMNEs are accustomed to dealing with high levels of uncertainty 
at home, they are better positioned to deal with uncertainty abroad (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018). In 
contrast, AMNEs are used to a properly functioning market system in their home countries and therefore 
may find it difficult to operate in countries with weak institutions. 
As previously mentioned, MNEs decide about the level of ownership that they wish to acquire 
based on the level of uncertainty perceived in the acquisition process. This explains why MNEs tend to 
acquire a lower level of ownership when making CBAs in emerging countries (Hypothesis 1). Nevertheless, 
because of the institutional learning acquired in their home country and the new capabilities developed, 
EMNEs are better prepared for operating successfully in emerging countries and therefore perceive lower 
uncertainty when entering such countries. This lower uncertainty makes EMNEs more likely than AMNEs 
to acquire a higher level of ownership when making CBAs in emerging countries. In other words, the 
institutional learning of EMNEs serves as a mechanism to reduce the uncertainty perceived when expanding 
into an emerging country; therefore, the emerging origin of EMNEs positively moderates the relationship 
between the ownership acquired in CBAs and the emerging nature of the host country. This reasoning leads 
us to our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Being an EMNE positively moderates the negative relationship between the level of 




3. RESEARCH SETTING, SAMPLE, VARIABLES AND METHODS  
3.1. The mobile telecommunications industry 
Our analyses are undertaken in the mobile telecommunications industry. This industry is highly 
suitable for the purposes of this study for many reasons. First, it is a very important sector that contributes 
significantly to the global economy. In 2016, the revenues of the mobile telecommunications industry 
amounted to US$3.3 trillion or 4.4 percent of the world GDP (GSMA, 2018). Second, it is an industry in 
which mobile groups have substantially expanded abroad in the last decades; additionally, CBAs are the 
most frequent entry mode. The growing number of entries and the preference for CBAs as the mode of 
entry make this industry highly suitable for analyzing the ownership strategies that MNEs follow when 
performing CBAs. One of the key reasons for the fast internationalization of telecom firms was the adoption 
of the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) as the standard of digital mobile networks in the 
1990s, which allowed the exploitation of economies of scale and learning around the world (Fuentelsaz et 
al., 2008; Gerpott and Jakopin, 2005). According to GSMA Intelligence (2018), nearly 70 percent of 
international entries made by telecom MNEs took place from 2000 to 2016. Additionally, 65 percent of the 
total entries taking place between 2000 and 2016 were performed through CBAs in this industry. The reason 
is that a greenfield entry of a telecom MNE is only possible when a new license is available in a market. 
Thus, greenfield investments are limited to certain time windows when license auctions take place 
(Claussen et al., 2018). For this reason, CBAs are the most frequent entry mode in the mobile 
telecommunications industry. Third, in this industry, there is wide diversity in terms of the origin of telecom 
MNEs and the countries that they have entered. This allows us to analyze better the interaction effect 
between home and host countries’ characteristics. Initially, telecom MNEs came from advanced economies 
in Europe and the United States and primarily entered other advanced countries. However, nowadays, we 
find high variability in terms of the economic development of both the home and the host country of mobile 
groups (Claussen et al., 2018).  
3.2. A descriptive analysis of the ownership strategies in the mobile telecommunications industry 
With regard to the ownership strategy, the evidence shows that the CBAs of mobile groups vary 
significantly in respect of the ownership acquired (Gerpott and Jakopin, 2008). Previous studies have 
primarily mentioned the restrictions imposed by the regulation on foreign direct investment (FDI), the stage 
of telecom liberalization, the reaction of former monopolistic operators and the strategic alliances of 
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incumbents as determinants of the ownership percentage acquired by telecom MNEs making CBAs (see 
Jakopin, 2008, for a review).  
However, prior studies have not investigated whether the ownership strategy in the mobile 
telecommunications industry varies between advanced and emerging host countries and between AMNEs 
and EMNEs. We offer a descriptive analysis of the ownership strategy followed by telecom multinationals 
with the aim of identifying the main relationships between the ownership strategies and the emerging nature 
of the home and host countries of MNEs. In particular, we carry out a descriptive analysis of the 175 CBAs 
that took place in the industry between 2001 and 2016. The 48 MNEs that performed these CBAs came 
from 35 home countries and expanded to 81 host countries.[4] As can be seen in Table I, the average 
percentage acquired was 66.7 percent. AMNEs made a total of 72 CBAs during this period, accounting for 
41 percent of the total. The average ownership acquired by AMNEs was 64.5 percent. EMNEs made 103 
CBAs (59 percent of the total), with an average of 66.14 percent ownership. Thus, EMNEs and AMNEs 
acquired similar levels of ownership. This may suggest that, on average, they follow similar ownership 
strategies. However, if we delve deeper into the analysis, we can see that the ownership percentage acquired 
varies depending on the level of host country development. As can be observed in the last column of Table 
I, the ownership percentage acquired in advanced countries is slightly higher than that in emerging countries 
(70.0% vs. 65.7%). Additionally, significant differences were found when considering the origin of the 
MNE. While the average ownership percentage acquired by AMNEs was much higher in advanced host 
countries than in emerging ones (74.2% vs. 56.4%), EMNEs acquired higher levels of ownership in 
emerging countries than in advanced countries (69.6% vs. 48.4%).  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table I about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
An additional point arises from Table I that should be highlighted. Whereas AMNEs entered 
emerging and advanced host countries equally (33 advanced and 39 emerging host countries), EMNEs 
primarily focused their expansion on emerging economies: only seven out of 103 CBAs took place in 
advanced countries during the period under analysis. To sum up, Table I allows us to infer two main 
conclusions: the level of the ownership percentage acquired is, on average, slightly higher in advanced 
 
 
4 See Appendix A for a detailed list of the host and home countries that are included in the sample. 
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countries; and EMNEs and AMNEs acquire higher levels of ownership in countries that have a similar level 
of economic development to their country of origin.  
We now take a step further and present a more detailed analysis of the evolution of the percentage 
acquired by mobile groups from 2001 to 2016, differentiating between their home countries. Table II shows 
the CBAs carried out by mobile groups from advanced countries, while Table III presents this information 
for EMNEs. As can be seen in Table II, AMNEs made a total of 72 CBAs. Almost three out of four of the 
CBAs made by AMNEs (53 out of 72) took place in the first half of our observation window—that is, from 
2001 to 2008. During these years, AMNEs entered both advanced and emerging countries, with slight 
predominance of the latter. With the exception of some years, such as 2009 and 2013, AMNEs acquired 
higher levels of ownership in advanced countries. In these countries, they acquired, on average, 74.2 percent 
of operators’ equity. In contrast, the mean value of the ownership acquired in emerging countries was 56.4 
percent. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table II and Table III about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
Regarding EMNEs, Table III provides some interesting information about the evolution of CBAs in 
emerging and advanced host countries. As can be observed in the last column of Table III, EMNEs primarily 
made their international expansion from 2004 to 2010. Although they started their internationalization 
process later than AMNEs, EMNEs undertook many CBAs as well. In fact, EMNEs have been involved in 
an accelerated internationalization process since 2004 and have primarily used CBAs as their entry mode 
to build faster resources and the capability to compete globally (Bonaglia et al., 2007; Liou et al., 2016; 
Mathews, 2006). Another interesting point that derives from Table III is that EMNEs tend to acquire a 
substantially lower ownership percentage when entering advanced countries than when expanding to 
emerging host countries (48.4% vs. 70%).  
Besides this, we can obtain interesting findings by paying attention to the number of CBAs and the 
ownership levels per group. Table IV and Table V provide further information about how many CBAs were 
made by each mobile group and the ownership that was acquired. Once again, we consider the origin of 
mobile groups and differentiate between EMNEs and AMNEs. Table IV refers specifically to EMNEs and 
Table V to AMNEs.  
With regard to AMNEs, Orange, Telia and Vodafone, which made eight, seven and seven CBAs, 
respectively, were the mobile groups with the greatest number of CBAs, as shown in Table IV. Looking at 
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where CBAs took place, we find significant differences in the ownership percentage that was acquired by 
AMNEs. In advanced countries, AMNEs acquired an average of over 50 percent, with the exception of 
NTT DoCoMo, and the figure was often close to 80 percent. However, the heterogeneity in the ownership 
percentage acquired by AMNEs was much higher when entering emerging countries. In this case, the 
percentage was often below 50 percent, with the exception of Orange, Telefónica and Vodafone, which 
acquired, on average, between 70 percent and 80 percent in emerging countries. The fact that Orange, 
Telefónica and Vodafone are some of the groups with the highest levels of international experience may 
explain this result since prior experience can influence firm behavior. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table IV about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
Regarding EMNEs, Table V shows that seven groups stand out as being primarily responsible for 
the CBAs made by EMNEs (67 out of 103 acquisitions). These groups are Bharti Airtel (which made 12 
CBAs), Zain (11), VimpelCom (11), Etisalat (9), Global Telecom (8), Maroc Telecom (8) and MTN (8). 
Table V also shows that almost all the CBAs carried out by EMNEs took place in emerging countries. 
Furthermore, the few acquisitions that occurred in advanced countries were made by groups that had 
previously completed acquisitions in emerging countries.[5] On average, the ownership acquired by EMNEs 
was higher in emerging countries (70.0%) than in advanced countries (48.4%). However, three groups—
MTN, Oi and VimpelCom—performed CBAs with higher levels of ownership in advanced countries than 
in emerging ones. MTN and VimpelCom are again two of the groups with the highest international 
experience of performing CBAs. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table V about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
3.3. Sample, variables and methodology 
The previous section is based on a descriptive analysis that takes into account the behavior of 
EMNEs and AMNEs when expanding abroad. Although this analysis provides us with an interesting 
perspective, we now deepen our analysis of the interaction between the levels of development of the home 
and host countries and its effect on the level of ownership acquired in CBAs to acquire better knowledge. 
 
 
5 In fact, groups that had previously made CBAs in emerging countries carried them out many times and 
not just once. 
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We test our hypotheses using the same sample as in the descriptive analysis—that is, 175 CBAs 
carried out in 81 host countries by 48 MNEs from 35 home countries in a time frame that covers 2001 to 
2016. Our data come from different sources, but the main one is GSMA Intelligence (2018). To obtain our 
control variables, we use the Heritage Foundation and the World Development Indicators. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the percentage of ownership that an MNE (the acquirer firm) acquires in 
a subsidiary (the target firm). In line with recent studies, we use a continuous variable that is bounded 
between 10 percent and 100 percent (Cuypers et al., 2015; Dow et al., 2016; Malhotra and Gaur, 2014).[6]  
Independent variables 
Emerging country. We introduce a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the country where 
the CBA takes place is an emerging country and 0 otherwise. Following previous studies, we use the official 
classification of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to classify countries as advanced or emerging (De 
Beule et al., 2014).[7]  
Emerging multinational enterprises (EMNEs). To account for the origin of the MNE, we also use a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the MNE comes from a country that is classified as an 
emerging country in accordance with the IMF classification and 0 otherwise.  
Control variables 
Similar to previous studies, our model controls for some firm and market characteristics. We control 
for the subsidiary size, since smaller subsidiaries may need more resources and therefore may be susceptible 
to being acquired with greater levels of ownership. We measure the subsidiary size as millions of 
connections.[8] We also control for the previous experience that mobile groups have in internationalizing 
(group international experience). We measure this variable by counting the number of countries—other 
than the original one—where the MNE has a presence. Greater international experience is associated with 
greater knowledge about the internationalization process and therefore with lower perceived uncertainty. 
The lower the uncertainty, the higher the level of ownership acquired (Chari and Chang, 2009).  
 
 
6 We follow the guidelines of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), which consider the existence of FDI when the MNE owns at least 10 percent of the 
subsidiary equity. Otherwise, MNEs may not exercise effective management control. 
7 This classification is dynamic, which means that some countries, such as Cyprus or Malta, changed their status during 
the observed period. However, in most of the cases (96.5%), countries maintained their status of emerging or advanced 
over the whole period. 
8 Connections make reference to the number of SIM cards (or phone numbers, where SIM cards are not used), excluding 
cellular M2M, that were registered on the mobile network at the end of the period (GSMA Intelligence, 2018). 
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With regard to market characteristics, we control for host and home country characteristics. In 
particular, we include the opening level of host countries (open markets). The Heritage Foundation 
calculates an index of economic freedom each year. This index measures the economic freedom based on 
12 factors, grouped into four broad pillars (rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency and open 
markets). Each factor has a value between 0 (lower freedom) and 100 (higher freedom). We calculate this 
variable as the average of the three factors’ value included in the open market pillar (trade, investment and 
financial freedom), following other studies with similar purposes (Meyer et al., 2009). The resulting 
measure is between 0 and 100. Higher values of this variable indicate greater openness of the market. 
Greater opening of the host country facilitates CBAs (Kandogan and Johnson, 2016) and is positively 
related to the acquired level of ownership. Similar to previous studies, we also control for the size of the 
host country (host country size) through its population in millions of habitants obtained from the World 
Development Indicators. Additionally, countries with lower levels of competition are expected to be more 
attractive for firms to enter. We approach competition through host country concentration, including the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index, on a scale from 0 to 10,000. Similarly, we control for the size and the 
competitiveness level of the home country by including home country concentration and home country size. 
 Finally, we also include some variables that relate to the home and host countries. In particular, 
we control for geographical distance since it may cause firms to perceive greater uncertainty (Malhotra 
and Gaur, 2014). In line with prior studies, we measure this according to the Geobytes database, which 
gives the kilometers between the capital city of the home country and that of the host country (Malhotra et 
al., 2009; Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010). We also include geographical distance,2 because the cost and 
benefit trade-off of full versus partial ownership varies at different levels of geographical distance 
(Malhotra and Gaur, 2014). In addition, we control for cultural distance, because previous studies have 
suggested that it increases uncertainty and therefore affects the ownership level acquired (Chari and Chang, 
2009; Malhotra et al., 2011). Foreign firms will seek to participate less in the local companies of culturally 
distant countries (Chari and Chang, 2009). We measure cultural distance using a binary variable that takes 
the value of 1 when there has been a colony–colonizing relationship (or vice versa) between the home and 
the host country at any time in the past and 0 otherwise (Albino-Pimentel et al., 2018). Finally, we include 




Table VI shows the descriptive statistics of our sample. The mean value of ownership is 66.7 percent, 
with a standard deviation of 32.8 percent. In accordance with our measure, the minimum ownership that 
mobile groups acquired in the observed period was 12 percent and the maximum was 100 percent. 
Regarding our independent variables, emerging country has a mean value of 0.8, with a standard deviation 
of 0.4. This means that the CBAs that are included in our sample took place more often in emerging 
countries than in advanced ones. Similarly, the mean value of EMNEs is 0.6, which indicates greater 
prevalence of CBAs made by EMNEs over those carried out by AMNEs. However, the standard deviation 
of this variable is 0.5, which indicates high variability regarding the home country of companies involved 
in CBAs. EMNEs such as Bharti Airtel and Zain carried out a high number of acquisitions in comparison 
with other groups, such as NMTC. Similarly, AMNEs such as Orange made eight acquisitions, while other 
companies, such as the Vivendi Group, made only one in the whole period. Regarding the control variables, 
we note that, on average, the subsidiary size is 4.3 million connections. However, the high standard 
deviation (8.7) reveals important differences between firms, which are reflected in the maximum (51) and 
minimum (0.01) values of this variable. MNEs also show great differences in their levels of 
internationalization, as is shown by the high value of the standard deviation of group international 
experience. On average, mobile groups expanded to 12 countries. Some groups, such as Softbank, only 
expanded to one foreign country, while others, such as Orange, entered more than 40 countries.  
Regarding the market characteristics, home and host countries show similar values for the 
competitiveness level. In particular, the mean value of host country concentration is 4,408 and the mean 
value of home country concentration is 3,974. The two also have similar standard deviations—1,547 and 
1,922, respectively. Nevertheless, this does not occur when we compare the size of the home and host 
countries. Home countries tend to be bigger than host countries. While the mean value of host country size 
is 42.8 million habitants, home country size has a mean value of 137.2 million habitants. Home countries 
also show greater variability in their size, as is shown by the value of the standard deviation. In addition, 
the mean value of open markets is 56.3, with a maximum of 90 and a minimum value of 13.3. Finally, we 
can observe that home and host countries, on average, face a distance of 3.8 thousand kilometers, as is 
shown by the mean value of geographical distance. Nevertheless, this variable shows a high standard 
deviation—2.92—which indicates great variability in the distance between home and host countries. 
Moreover, home and host countries tend to be culturally different, as can be seen in the mean value of 
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cultural distance, which is 0.2. This value indicates that most of the home and host countries in our sample 
do not have a previous colony–colonizing relationship. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table VI about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
Table VII shows the correlations between the variables that are included in our analysis. Generally 
speaking, the variables do not show very high correlations. Multicollinearity does not pose a problem. We 
carried out a test for potential multicollinearity before estimating the regression model and found that the 
variance inflation factor in our models was below 4, far below the threshold of 10 (Kutner et al., 2005). 
Emerging country is negatively correlated with our dependent variable, while EMNEs are positively 
associated with it. One of the highest correlations is found between host country size and subsidiary size 
(0.52). This is because subsidiaries with higher levels of mobile connections are found in the most populated 
host countries (e.g. Bangladesh, Indonesia and the United States). Similarly, home country size and home 
country concentration present a correlation of -0.42. This may be explained by the fact that bigger countries 
tend to attract more firms (Nachum et al., 2008). The greater the number of competitors in the home market, 
the lower the probability of having concentrated home countries. Finally, emerging country shows a 
correlation of -0.42 with open markets. Emerging countries are often closer in terms of the ease of entering 
them than advanced countries.  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table VII about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
Methodology 
The dependent variable is a limited variable subject to an upper (100%) and a lower (10%) boundary. 
For limited dependent variables, a classic ordinary least squares regression model will give biased and 
inconsistent estimates (Maddala, 1983). In this situation, a Tobit regression analysis is recommended 
(Greene, 1993). Indeed, Tobit estimation has been performed in prior studies with an identical dependent 
variable (Chari and Chang, 2009; Cuypers et al., 2015; Dow et al., 2016; Malhotra and Gaur, 2014; Pan et 
al., 2014). 
4. RESULTS 
Table VIII provides the results of our Tobit estimations (Models 1 to 5). Model 1 only considers the 
influence of the control variables in the ownership acquired by MNEs. Model 2 introduces the effect that 
CBAs in an emerging country have on the dependent variable, to test Hypothesis 1. Model 3 introduces the 
19 
 
variable EMNEs to the baseline model and Model 4 incorporates the direct effect of both emerging country 
and EMNEs. Finally, Model 5 introduces the interaction effect between emerging country and EMNEs to 
test Hypothesis 2. The likelihood ratio tests are presented at the bottom of Table VIII. They show that 
Model 5 is the model that best fits our data; thus, we employ it to comment our results.  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table VIII about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
Hypothesis 1 stated that the emerging nature of the host country negatively influences the percentage 
that MNEs acquire in the subsidiary. Model 5 shows that emerging country has a negative and significant 
effect on ownership (β= -35.114; p<0.01). This means that CBAs in emerging countries are carried out with 
lower levels of ownership, giving support to Hypothesis 1. MNEs tend to acquire higher levels of ownership 
in subsidiaries that are located in advanced countries. 
However, it is not only the emerging nature of the host country that is important in the choice of 
ownership acquired, but also the origin of the MNE. Hypothesis 2 posited that MNEs that come from 
emerging countries acquire higher levels of ownership in emerging countries than AMNEs. Model 5 shows 
that the interaction term between emerging country and EMNEs is positive and statistically significant 
(β=44.004; p<0.05). Being an EMNE positively moderates the negative impact that making a CBA in an 
emerging country has on the percentage of ownership acquired. EMNEs opt for a greater ownership 
percentage than AMNEs when making CBAs in emerging countries. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2 
and we cannot therefore reject it.  
Figure I depicts this moderating effect by showing two lines. The solid line refers to AMNEs and 
the dotted line to EMNEs. The former has a negative slope, which means that AMNEs acquire lower 
ownership percentages in emerging countries than in advanced ones. The opposite trend is found in the case 
of EMNEs. The positive slope of the dotted line means that EMNEs opt for greater levels of ownership in 
emerging countries than in advanced countries. This confirms our premise that the origin of the MNE plays 
a significant role in understanding the relationship between the level of ownership acquired in a CBA and 
the level of development of the host country where the CBA takes place. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure I about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
20 
 
This research has analyzed the entry by MNEs in the mobile telecommunications industry when 
performing CBAs. More precisely, we have observed that AMNEs and EMNEs behave differently when 
deciding on the ownership to acquire when entering a foreign country. Prior studies have suggested that the 
characteristics of the host country significantly determine the level of ownership acquired in a subsidiary. 
Our premise is that it is not only the host country characteristics that are relevant but also the characteristics 
of the home country. The latter define the conditions under which MNEs are accustomed to operating and 
therefore influence their perception of the host country characteristics. Following recent studies, we noted 
that emerging and advanced countries show great differences in terms of their market characteristics. Thus, 
we differentiated home and host countries and distinguished between EMNEs and AMNEs. This 
classification led us to address two research questions. 
Firstly, we analyzed how the emerging or advanced nature of the host country determines the level 
of ownership acquired by MNEs when making CBAs. Our results show that MNEs acquire higher levels 
of subsidiaries’ ownership when CBAs take place in advanced countries. Emerging countries are 
characterized by institutional voids that cause MNEs to perceive greater uncertainty surrounding CBAs. 
Due to this, they prefer to acquire a lower percentage of ownership to be able to leave the investment more 
easily if their expectations are unsatisfied. Moreover, it allows MNEs to maintain local investors that 
facilitate their introduction into the informal business network of the emerging country. Our results expand 
prior studies and confirm that the level of development of the host country is highly relevant to explaining 
the percentage of ownership acquired by MNEs in regulated industries.  
Secondly, we investigated whether being an EMNE alters the relationship between the development 
of the host country and the level of ownership acquired in CBAs. AMNEs and EMNEs behave differently 
when making CBAs since they are accustomed to different market conditions in their home countries. In 
particular, we posited that EMNEs acquire higher levels of ownership than AMNEs when making CBAs 
in emerging countries. Our results confirm this assumption. EMNEs are accustomed to operating under 
weaker market institutions in their home countries (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008), so, in comparison 
with AMNEs, they perceive lower uncertainty when making CBAs in other emerging countries. Advanced 
countries usually have stronger market systems that facilitate the development of economic activities. Thus, 
AMNEs trust in the market mechanisms that support their activities and perceive great uncertainty when 
these conditions do not exist. This explains why they perceive emerging countries as riskier host countries 
than EMNEs do. In contrast, EMNEs have a different starting point and know how to operate under weaker 
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market mechanisms. Thus, they do not perceive as much uncertainty as AMNEs when making CBAs in 
other emerging countries and are willing to acquire higher levels of ownership. Our results confirm that 
MNEs in regulated industries use their skills in dealing with governments and regulators when expanding 
abroad (García-Canal and Guillén, 2008). EMNEs are likely to acquire greater levels of ownership because 
they are more confident about dealing with the uncertainty of the host country than AMNEs.  
Besides these differences in the internationalization behavior of EMNEs and AMNEs, our research 
suggests that the prior theories that have been used to explain the internationalization patterns of AMNEs 
can also be applied to explain the behavior of EMNEs. We thus shed light on the debate on this issue in the 
international business literature (Luo and Tung, 2007). We observe that both AMNEs and EMNEs are more 
likely to expand into countries that are institutionally similar to their home country. The explanation for 
this is that the institutional learning acquired in the home country plays a significant role in the 
internationalization process of MNEs. Broadly speaking, AMNEs are present in a greater number of 
advanced host countries than emerging host countries, while EMNEs have expanded more into emerging 
host countries than advanced host countries. Additionally, our analysis indicates that the institutional 
learning developed in their home country is especially useful when EMNEs expand into countries where 
the rules of the game are relatively similar, conferring on them greater confidence that, in turn, leads them 
to acquire a larger share of the target company.  
Our study may be of interest to target firms’ managers and public policy makers. From a managerial 
point of view, this study shows that the level of development of the country where the target company is 
located and the level of development of the country of the acquirer will determine the percentage of 
ownership that MNEs will acquire. The target company may anticipate which MNEs are more likely to 
acquire higher levels of equity based on their location. When the target company is located in an emerging 
country, the likelihood of being majority owned by an MNE that comes from an emerging country is greater. 
As EMNEs have a better understanding of how to counteract institutional voids in emerging countries as a 
consequence of their institutional learning, managers of AMNEs can find a valuable mechanism for 
entering emerging markets in the development of strategic alliances with EMNEs. From the point of view 
of policy makers, this study shows that their decision about how much to intercede in the functioning system 
of the market will determine the level of ownership that MNEs are likely to acquire when making a CBA. 
In this vein, governments from emerging countries that are interested in attracting investment from 
advanced economies should try to reduce the institutional voids that foreign investors perceive. For 
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instance, policy makers should try to improve the system of property rights protection and promote 
mechanisms to facilitate the introduction of foreign investors into the informal business network (e.g., trade 
associations and conventions). This improvement in the rules of the game is less important when the interest 
of the governments of emerging countries lies in attracting investments from companies based in other 
emerging countries. 
Our study has contributed to the literature regarding ownership decisions in CBAs through the 
incorporation of the role of home country characteristics into the analysis of MNEs’ strategic decisions. 
Nevertheless, some issues remain open and deserve further attention in future research. First, our study 
distinguishes between emerging and advanced countries according to the official classification of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, there are important differences between the countries 
included in each of these two groups, so a finer-grained analysis of the different economies would improve 
our study. A second future line of research concerns the paper’s treatment of institutions. As Cuervo-
Cazurra et al. (2019, p. 621) suggested, “we still do not understand well how the various dimensions of 
institutions interact with each other and the influence that such interactions have on firm behavior.” For 
this reason, future analysis should consider how more specific dimensions of the formal and informal 
institutional environment (in both advanced and emerging markets) interact in explaining MNEs’ strategy 
and performance. In particular, one variable that may deserve further attention is the cultural distance 
between home and host countries. We approach it through a dummy variable based on the existence of a 
past colony–colonizing relationship (or vice versa) between the home and the host country (Albino-
Pimentel et al., 2018). However, alternative variables have been used in the literature, such as the Kogut 
and Singh index (1988) based on Hofstede or GLOBE measures. It was not possible for us to include these 
alternative variables because they would significantly reduce our emerging-market sample, but this 
constitutes a clear avenue for future studies. 
Our research is not exempt from limitations. Firstly, we differentiate between emerging and 
advanced host and home countries by using the IMF official classification. Even though this classification 
has been used in prior research with similar purposes, we cannot overlook the possibility that countries that 
are classified into the same group can differ substantially. In fact, when looking at the evolution of 
countries’ development over time, it is apparent that some changed their status during the observed period. 
This means that those emerging (advanced) countries that are closer to the threshold may be more similar 
to advanced (emerging) countries than to other countries in the same category. Future research may take 
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care of this issue by making more accurate classifications of countries. Secondly, we control for prior 
experience in making CBAs. However, we do not differentiate whether this experience took place in 
advanced or emerging countries. AMNEs that have made many CBAs in emerging countries may have 
acquired enough knowledge about the functioning of these countries and therefore may perceive less 
uncertainty than other AMNEs without such experience.  
To conclude, it is important to note that this study contributes to the prior literature in two ways. 
Firstly, we show that telecom MNEs face institutional voids in emerging markets that make them acquire 
higher levels of ownership in advanced countries than in emerging countries. Secondly, our results 
contribute to the literature by confirming that EMNEs and AMNEs behave differently when expanding 
abroad because of their different perceptions of uncertainty derived from institutional voids in emerging 
markets. While EMNEs are used to counteracting institutional voids in their home countries, AMNEs find 
investments in emerging countries to be risky ventures. Norms and regulations are usually less developed 
in these countries, which makes business more difficult to conduct. This often leads to an increase in the 
perceived uncertainty surrounding CBAs. However, EMNEs feel much more comfortable than AMNEs 
when making CBAs in emerging countries, so they tend to acquire higher levels of ownership than AMNEs 
in these countries. 
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Table I. The ownership acquired depending on the level of development of the host and the home 
countries  
AMNE EMNE Total  
Advanced host 
country 
74.2 48.4 70.0 Average percentage acquired 
33 7 40 Number of CBAs 
Emerging host 
country 
56.4 70.0 65.8 Average percentage acquired 
39 96 135 Number of CBAs 
Total 
64.5 68.1 66.7 Average percentage acquired 
72 103 175 Number of CBAs 
 
 
Table II. AMNEs’ acquisitions by year 


















2001 6 48.4 7 52.6 13 
2002 4 100 2 55.1 6 
2003 0 - 2 30.2 2 
2004 0 - 3 100 3 
2005 3 50.8 3 31 6 
2006 5 99.9 4 74.5 9 
2007 2 95 8 42.8 10 
2008 1 100 3 56.9 4 
2009 5 73.4 1 100 6 
2010 2 75 2 45.5 4 
2011 0 - 2 59.5 2 
2012 0 - 0 - 0 
2013 2 50.1 1 100 3 
2014 0 - 0 - 0 
2015 2 100 1 45 3 
2016 1 12 0 - 1 
Total 33 74.2 39 56.4 72 
 
 
Table III. EMNEs’ acquisitions by year 


















2001 0 - 0 - 0 
2002 0 - 2 72.8 2 
2003 0 - 3 78.5 3 
2004 1 100 10 82.5 11 
2005 2 13.2 24 68.1 26 
2006 0 - 10 72 10 
2007 1 12.3 7 40.7 8 
2008 0 - 7 74.3 7 
2009 0 - 3 71.8 3 
2010 0 - 13 86.8 13 
2011 1 100 3 43.6 4 
2012 0 - 1 100 1 
2013 0 - 0 - 0 
2014 1 100 4 42.4 5 
2015 0 - 6 95 6 
2016 1 50 3 40 4 
Total 7 48.4 96 70.0 103 
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Orange Group 2 64.7 6 70.1 8 
Telia Group 3 100 4 48.5 7 
Vodafone Group 5 60.3 2 70 7 
Singtel Group 1 100 4 34.3 5 
Telefónica Group 2 100 3 83.5 5 
Wind Telecom Group 
(Merged Q2 2011) 
2 81.4 2 24.1 4 
Telenor Group 2 55.9 2 60.2 4 
Softbank Group 4 94.7  -  - 4 
AINMT Group (Access 
Industries Group) 
3 88.3 - -  3 
NTT DOCOMO Group 2 13.5 1 30 3 
Tele2 Group 1 100 2 70.5 3 
Telekom Austria Group  - -  3 73 3 
Trilogy International 
Partners Group 
1 52 2 85.8 3 
PHAROL Group - - 2 28.8 2 
Telekom Slovenije Group  -  - 2 72.5 2 
CK Hutchison Group  -  - 1 29.8 1 
NJJ Group 1 100 -   - 1 
Orange Belgium Group 1 90  -  - 1 
OTE Group -  -  1 13 1 
Proximus Group 1 100  -  - 1 
TDC Group 1 76.5  -  - 1 
Telecom Italia Group  - 
 
1 54.8 1 
Telstra Group 1 60  -  - 1 
Vivendi Group  -  - 1 26 1 


















Total number of 
acquisitions 
Bharti Airtel Group - - 12 88.75 12 
Zain Group - - 11 79.4 11 
VimpelCom Group 2 75 9 71.8 11 
Etisalat Group - - 9 51 9 
Global Telecom 
Group 1 13.7 7 68.6 8 
Maroc Telecom 
Group - - 8 84 8 
MTN Group 1 100 7 81.4 8 
Axiata Group 1 12.6 4 59.6 5 
MTS Group - - 5 90.8 5 
América Móvil 
Group - - 4 100 4 




- - 3 38.2 3 
Batelco Group - - 2 58 2 
Ooredoo Group 1 12.3 1 40.8 2 
Turkcell Group - - 2 65.5 2 
Abu Dhabi Group - - 1 15 1 
Africell Group 
(Lintel Group) - - 1 95 1 





- - 1 51 1 
Megafone Group - - 1 75 1 




- - 1 34.7 1 
STC Group - - 1 51 1 
Telekom Srbija 
Group - - 1 65 1 






Table VI. Descriptive statistics (N=175) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ownership 66.7 32.8 0.1 100 
Emerging country 0.8 0.4 0 1 
EMNEs 0.6 0.5 0 1 
Subsidiary size 4.3 8.7 0.01 51.0 
Group international experience 12.8 9.4 1 44 
Host country concentration 4408 1547 1485 10000 
Home country concentration 3974 1922 1453 10000 
Host country size 42.8 66.3 0.4 317.7 
Home country size 137.2 306.0 0.9 1335 
Open markets 56.3 16.2 13.3 90 
Geographical distance 3.8 2.9 0 17.0 
Geographical distance2 22.7 32.4 0 289 






Table VII. Correlations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Ownership (1) 1             
Emerging country (2) -0.05 1            
EMNEs (3) 0.05 0.46* 1           
Subsidiary size (4) -0.38* -0.22* -0.03 1          
Group international experience (5) 0.07 -0.07 -0.22* 0.12 1         
Host country concentration (6) -0.01 0.29* 0.10 -0.30* -0.02 1        
Home country concentration (7) -0.15* 0.14* 0.28* -0.10 -0.19* 0.08 1       
Host country size (8) -0.39* -0.01 -0.04 0.52* -0.06 -0.30* -0.02 1      
Home country size (9) 0.12 0.13* 0.24* 0.08 0.10 -0.09 -0.42* 0.06 1     
Open markets (10) 0.06 -0.42* -0.36* 0.16* 0.07 -0.16* -0.08 -0.13* -0.12* 1    
Geographical distance (11) -0.11 0.14* 0.12 -0.03 0.21* 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.25* -0.13* 1   
Geographical distance2 (12) -0.11 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.18* -0.04 -0.04 0.08 0.20* 0.06 0.91* 1  
Cultural distance (13) 0.12 -0.08 -0.12 -0.10 -0.02 0.01 -0.21* -0.20* -0.09 0.03 -0.14* -0.04 1 




Table VIII. Determinants of ownership acquired 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Emerging country  -19.247*  -23.257** -35.114*** 
  (10.576)  (10.759) (11.635) 
EMNEs   8.726 13.074 -25.205 
   (8.001) (8.154) (17.532) 
Emerging country * EMNEs     44.004** 
     (18.000) 
Subsidiary size -1.752*** -1.840*** -1.729*** -1.819*** -1.872*** 
 (0.572) (0.573) (0.567) (0.565) (0.552) 
Group international experience 0.682* 0.671* 0.761** 0.785** 0.788** 
 (0.352) (0.351) (0.357) (0.353) (0.345) 
Host country concentration -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Home country concentration -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Host country size -0.103* -0.099* -0.104* -0.100* -0.103* 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.056) 
Home country size 0.019 0.021 0.014 0.013 0.011 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Open markets 0.349 0.075 0.364 0.039 0.115 
 (0.239) (0.280) (0.237) (0.277) (0.273) 
Geographical distance 0.949 1.741 0.501 1.250 2.681 
 (2.996) (3.011) (3.003) (2.992) (2.974) 
Geographical distance2 -0.312 -0.378 -0.273 -0.333 -0.428* 
 (0.253) (0.254) (0.254) (0.253) (0.250) 
Cultural distance 5.656 6.334 4.773 5.094 8.042 
 (8.023) (8.029) (7.985) (7.942) (7.892) 
Dummy years Included*** Included*** Included*** Included*** Included*** 
_cons 29.645 50.405 25.567 48.535 54.388* 
 (29.525) (31.406) (29.544) (31.008) (30.337) 
sigma      
_cons 34.144*** 33.891*** 33.908*** 33.482*** 32.632*** 
 (2.457) (2.436) (2.442) (2.408) (2.345) 
N 175 175 175 175 175 
LL ratio test vs Model 1  3.35* 1.18 5.89* 11.74*** 
LL ratio test vs Model 2    2.54 8.39** 
LL ratio test vs Model 3    4.71** 10.56*** 
LL ratio test vs Model 4     5.85** 








































APPENDIX A. Host and Home Countries Included 
 
Host countries (81 countries) 
Angola Congo Ireland New Zealand Tunisia 
Armenia Congo, Dem. Rep Italy Niger Turkey 
Australia Cote d'Ivoire Japan Nigeria Turkmenistan 
Bangladesh Cyprus Jordan Norway Uganda 
Belarus Denmark Kazakhstan Pakistan Ukraine 
Benin Egypt Kenya Paraguay United Arab Emirates 
Bolivia Equatorial Guinea Korea, South Peru United Kingdom 
Bosnia Estonia Kyrgyzstan Portugal USA 
Botswana Gabon Laos Saudi Arabia Uruguay 
Bulgaria Greece Luxembourg Singapore Uzbekistan 
Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Macedonia Slovenia Venezuela 
Burundi Guyana Malta Spain Yemen 
Cabo Verde Haiti Moldova Sri Lanka Zambia 
Central Africa Honduras Morocco Sweden  
Chad Hong Kong Namibia Switzerland  
Chile Indonesia Nepal Tajikistan  
Colombia Iran Netherlands Togo  
 
 
Home country group (35 countries) 
Australia France Japan Portugal South Africa 
Austria Gambia Kuwait Qatar Spain 
Bahrein Greece Luxemburg Russian Federation Sweden 
Belgium Hong Kong Malaysia Saudi Arabia Turkey 
Brazil India Mexico Serbia United Arab Emirates 
Denmark Italy Morocco Singapore United Kingdom 
Egypt Jamaica Norway Slovenia USA 
 
